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12 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator Leverett Saltonstall

1. On 11 October 1962 William H. Darden telephoned asking about the availability of Mr. McCone to brief the CIA Subcommittee of Senate Armed Services. He explained that Senator Saltonstall had talked with Senator Russell about this. Subsequently, Mr. Darden advised that Senator Russell would not have time to chair such a meeting and would turn action over to Senator Saltonstall. Senator Saltonstall called General Carter and arrangements were made to meet the Senator in his office at 11:45 a.m., 12 October 1962.

2. General Carter, accompanied by Mr. Sheldon and Mr. Warner, met with Senator Saltonstall at 11:45 a.m. for approximately 35 minutes. Senator Saltonstall said Senator Russell had wanted to be present and called him while we were there; Senator Russell could not make it. Senator Saltonstall started out by discussing Senator Keating's speech on the floor of several days ago mentioning known existence of MRBM sites in Cuba. Senator Keating had expressed concern to Senator Saltonstall privately about this, hinting that the Administration was not furnishing all information. Senator Keating had further indicated that he wished to avoid contact with CIA on this so that he could speak freely based on his own sources. Senator Keating further added that information he had received in the past on the situation in Cuba had proved correct. General Carter stated there was no hard evidence on any MRBM sites in Cuba, although of course there are occasionally reports on this from refugees. General Carter stated it is hoped within the next day or so to photograph the very areas where the alleged MRBM sites are

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located. General Carter then gave Senator Saltonstall the specific information included in the briefing sheet dated 12 October 1962, which is attached. In addition, General Carter pointed out that Mr. McCone and he believed that the Soviets would put in MRBMs although there were differing views on this in the intelligence community. He carefully pointed out that there was no evidence to this effect but he believed that Khrushchev would do this looking toward the ultimate objective of expanding such bases into other Latin American countries, thus being in a propaganda and bargaining position to talk to the U. S. and the world in general about the U. S. missile bases in Pakistan and other areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union. General Carter discussed the IL 28 possibility, saying that in one view this was simply a defensive weapon but that in another it could be construed as an offensive weapon. Presumably the crates are on the docks now and in another two weeks could be assembled when we would be able to pick them up on air fields.


3. General Carter then touched very quickly on the Berlin situation, South Vietnam, and Laos, briefing sheets on which are also attached.

4. Senator Saltonstall raised several questions about the delay in the prisoner exchange deal, pointing out he did not know whether it was for purposes of letting the Congress get away but he thought sentiment against the deal was growing. He was advised that the delay was caused by Castro solely and is based on a schism in his own ranks with the hard-line communists being against the deal and pressing for delay, whereas apparently the older supporters of Castro and Castro himself appear to be anxious to consummate the deal as quickly as possible.

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5. Senator Saltonstall was very grateful to General Carter for having come up to brief him and seemed to grasp

  
the highlights of the briefing since he repeated them in summary fashion in order that he could discuss them with Senator Russell.

JOHN S. WARNER  
Legislative Counsel

Attachments

OGC/LC:JSW:jeb

Briefing for  
Senator Saltonstall

12 October 1962

CUBA

I. The buildup of Soviet-supplied military equipment in Cuba that began in late July is continuing.

A. Thus far, we have confirmed 20 SA-2 surface to-air missile (SAM) sites and three coastal defense cruise missile installations in Cuba.

B. At least 26 and possibly as many as 35 MIG-21 jet fighters have been delivered or are en route.

C. At least 12 missile-equipped KOMAR-class patrol boats have arrived.

D. All this is in addition to more tanks, artillery, etc.

II. The 20 SAM sites will almost complete the air defense coverage of the island.

A. Others are probably under construction or will be.

B. Some could already be operational, though we still lack conclusive evidence of this.

C. The Soviet SAM system is estimated to have an effective air defense capability to ranges of about 20 to 25 miles and maximum effectiveness at altitudes between 10,000 and 60,000 feet.

D. The coastal defense cruise missiles are believed to have relatively short range.

III. The MIG-21 jet fighters delivered since August are in addition to about 60 MIG's of less advanced types sent to Cuba since the summer of 1961.

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*Range of MIG-21 400-700  
miles depending on mission.*

A. The MIG-21 has a speed in excess of 1,000 miles per hour and is normally armed with two air-to-air missiles as well as rockets and cannon.

IV. The KOMAR-class boats carry two missiles each with useful ranges of about 15 miles. The boats have a range radius of about 325 miles.

A. These boats are in addition to 13 or more motor torpedo boats and six Khronstadt-class subchasers delivered earlier this year.

V. US Navy low-altitude photographs of the Soviet vessel Kasimov, which arrived at a Cuban port about 1 October, show that it carried ten aircraft crates probably containing fuselages of IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers.

A. No other Soviet aircraft is known to have been shipped in this highly distinctive type of crate.

B. This is the first evidence we have had to indicate that bombers may have been delivered to Cuba.

C. There is no evidence that any more are en route.

D. The radius of the IL-28 is 740 nautical miles.

VI. Accompanying these military shipments have been a minimum of 5,000 Soviet military personnel and possibly many more.

A. The majority have been engaged at the missile site installations, although some have been training Cuban pilots and other military personnel.

1. It is estimated that about 125 trained personnel are required to operate each SAM site, thus, about 2,500 of the

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Soviet personnel will be required to man these sites alone.

2. There is no evidence that the training of Cubans in the operation of the SAM sites has yet begun.

3. After such training begins, it will be about a year before Cubans could operate the equipment without extensive Soviet technical support.

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BERLIN

I. <sup>in the city of</sup> The Berlin situation is relatively quiet; both sides have struck an uneasy balance which is likely to remain for the next several weeks.

A. The Wall now rings the Western part of the city on all sides; signs identify the sector and zonal borders as an "international frontier" which intruders violate at their own risk.

B. Several times a week East German refugees trying to escape to West Berlin are shot.

C. On the other hand, Allied military personnel in uniform, particularly US troops, continue to cross into East Berlin via the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. US reconnaissance patrols enter East Berlin as often as 10 or 12 times a day.

D. The Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and Spandau Prison, located in West Berlin, are the only remaining four-power organs. The Soviets also guard their War Memorial in the Tiergarten District of the British Sector.

1. The Russians seem to value these as symbols of their "right" to be in West Berlin and seek to equate their access to the War Memorial enclave with Allied access to <sup>EAST</sup> West Berlin.

2. They probably believe that Western desire to continue four-power operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center prevents the Allies from excluding Soviet personnel from West Berlin.

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II. The Communists, however, can turn on the heat at any time.

A. The USSR has turned nominal control of East Berlin over to the East Germans, but some Russian troops remain billeted in East Berlin.

1. Should this be followed by the formal incorporation of East Berlin into the GDR, Allied patrols are likely to be excluded from East Berlin or at least subjected to East German "controls" at Friedrichstrasse.

B. The Russians can interfere with Allied access from West Germany via the air corridors, rail lines, or Helmstedt autobahn at any time.

C. Furthermore, the West Berliners are ultra-sensitive to anything which they interpret as Western failure to respond appropriately to Soviet "provocations."

III. The USSR appears to be marking time on the Berlin question, at least until after the US elections.

A. Khrushchev is reliably reported to be planning an appearance at the UNGA in mid-November, at which time he hopes to meet with the President.

B. More talks between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko are likely before the end of the year.

C. ~~Under these circumstances, Khrushchev is unlikely to bring tension in Berlin to a dangerous level, but he is~~ capable of stepping up pressure <sup>at any time</sup> ~~from time to time~~ in an effort to keep the West off balance or to provoke disagreement between the US, UK, West Germany and France.

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**SOUTH VIETNAM**

I. While the Viet Cong are being hounded by more aggressive government actions, they retain both the will and the capability to continue the war against President Diem:

A. With US helicopters flying South Vietnamese regulars into battle, the Viet Cong may be finding it hard to concentrate their forces in many areas.

B. Normally, we expect the Viet Cong to initiate a series of battalion-size attacks each fall. This campaign may be coming but it has not materialized yet.

C. The guerrillas (20,000 - 22,000) are still conducting small unit actions--the strategic hamlets are prime targets--and some of their units are short of food.

II. On the other side of the ledger, there are ample signs that the Viet Cong political and military structure is being developed steadily:

A. Our intelligence indicates that the Viet Cong are building a professional army in the remote, rugged highlands of northern South Vietnam--and building it around infiltrated North Vietnamese army regulars.

1. A 400-man group was reported to have entered this area, by way of Laos, on 30 September.

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LAOS

I. Soviet aircraft still fly daily runs from North Vietnam to Laos:

A. Eleven flights will be made today; last week there were 46--a typical week in the airlift of supplies and munitions which began in December 1960 (over 4,500 flights have been made).

II. The 7 October deadline for withdrawal of all foreign troops has gone--but the North Vietnamese have not:

A. We were estimating 9,000 - 10,000 North Vietnamese military personnel in Laos when the Geneva Accords were signed on 23 July. We believe almost half that number (4,000-5,000) may still be there dispersed in Pathet Lao redoubts.

III. While maintaining a precarious existence since its formation in June, Souvanna Phouma's coalition government has made little progress toward resolving its basic problems:

A. Freedom of movement has not yet been established; the Pathet Lao refuse access to their territory.

B. A cease-fire has not been negotiated; the Pathet Lao continue their effort to cripple Meo strength.

C. No real progress has been made toward military and administrative integration; each faction retains its forces and its own territory.

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